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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MAMIE NUNNELLY et al., 
Plaintiffs and AppeUants, 
vs. 
OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL SAV-
INGS AND LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 6657 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, COLONIAL 
CORPORATION, M. L. DYE AND S. G. DYE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In their "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" appearing on 
pages 1-3 of their brief, appellants inadvertently fail to 
mention various allegations and omissions in their com-
plaint which preclude a class suit and unmistakably dis-
close a misjoinder of parties and causes of action. 
(Except as otherwise indicated, the italics herein are ours.) 
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2 
Under appropriate titles we shall later discuss the 
motions to strike and the uncertainty of various allegations 
of the complaint. 
In paragraph 11 of the complaint (R. 3-4) it is alleged 
that plaintiff Nunnelly was the owner of an investment 
certificate in the Association on or about the year 1937 and 
that the other plaintiffs respectively owned designated in-
vestment certificates on or about the year 1935. 
In paragraph 13 of the complaint (R. 4) it is alleged 
that "during the years 1934, 1935 and 1936" said Associa-
tion came into possession and still has possession of said 
certificates and that same were thus obtained from plain-
tiffs through the alleged frauds set forth in the complaint, 
with no payment of said certificates or any part thereof 
"except various property of no substantial value." The 
"various property" is not identified or described and no 
offer to return same is made. 
In paragraph 14 of the complaint (R. 4-5) the alleged 
frauds are enumerated, consisting of claimed representa-
tions brought to the attention of plaintiffs and others sim-
ilarly situated that said certificates had slight if any value, 
concealment from them of the true condition of the Associa-
tion, and manipulation and depression of the market for 
such certificates. Said frauds are alleged to have been pur-
suant to a conspiracy entered into in the year 1933 by "all 
of the defendants, together with certain other persons who 
were directors of the corporations." How or in what manner 
or by what means the alleged concealment or the alleged 
manipulation or depression of the market was accomplished 
or why the alleged frauds were not earlier discovered does 
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not appear. It is also alleged in said paragraph 14 that the 
corporate defendants "diverted from their respective treas-
uries large sums of money equitably belonging to said cer-
tificate holders and paid out the same for expenses and for 
commissions to said agents" and "to some extent" and "in 
some instances" funds thus diverted were used to pay for 
investment certificates procured from plaintiffs. Although 
no claim is made that any plaintiff has ever been a stock-
holder of defendants Colonial Corporation or Atlas Realty 
Company and the complaint is silent as to how or why the 
alleged money "diverted from their respective treasuries" 
belonged to plaintiffs or was of concern to them or any of 
them, an accounting therefor is demanded in the second 
paragraph of the prayer of the complaint (R. 7). 
In paragraph 15 of the complaint (R. 5-6), without 
giving any information as to the time or place of any of the 
respective transactions with the respective plaintiffs or as 
to the identity of persons present or participating therein, 
or as to the consideration paid for any certificate of any 
plaintiff or any other term or condition of any alleged con-
tract which any plaintiff now seeks to have rescinded, it is 
alleged that plaintiffs "did part with their certificates with-
out receiving payment therefor, except as hereinabove 
stated." 
In paragraph 16 of the complaint (R. 6) it is alleged 
that "the defendants" have misappropriated Association 
money for excessive salaries to the defendant Dyes and for 
illegitimate expenses in the commission of said frauds. 
In paragraph 17 of the complaint (R. 6) it is alleged 
that in the year 1937 "the said defendants Dye and the 
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defendant corporations" fraudulently transferred $85,000.00 
worth of Association assets to defendant Colonial Corpora-
tion. The complaint is silent as to any possible concern of 
any of the other defendants in this alleged transaction. 
In paragraph 18 of the complaint (R. 6) it is alleged 
that defendant Association and Colonial Corporation are 
and for several years past have been "insolvent." 
In paragraph 19 of the complaint (R. 6-7) it is alleged 
that the amounts due plaintiffs and other investment cer-
tificate holders similarly situated are so large that said 
Association cannot pay them in full and a prorating of assets 
would therefore be necessary. 
Plaintiffs pray (R. 7) : (1) that the status of plaintiffs 
be adjudicated, that they be adjudged to be the owners of 
said certificates and "that they have judgment against the 
defendants for the unpaid amounts thereof"; (2) that 
there be an accounting by all defendants in respect of all 
matters alleged in the complaint; (3) that defendants be 
enjoined from canceling said certificates; ( 4) that a receiver 
be appointed to take charge of and conserve the assets of 
the defendant A~sociation and Colonial Corporation; (5) 
that judgment be entered against Colonial Corporation "to 
the use of the defendant Ogden First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association and the plaintiffs" for an accounting and 
return to the treasury of the assets transferred to Colonial 
Corporation; (6) that there be a marshaling of assets and 
liabilities of defendant Association and a liquidation there-
of and a distribution of its assets among those entitled there-
to; and (7) for general relief, costs of suit and "for attor-
ney's fees." 
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We shall endeavor to follow the order of discussion 
adopted in appellants' brief. 
WHAT CAUSE OR CAUSES OF ACTION ARE STATED? 
It is true that we demurred to the complaint upon the 
ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action in favor of plaintiffs or any of them and 
against the demurring defendants and that the trial court 
overruled the demurrer. In support of this ruling appellants 
spear-head their discussion with citation of the Badger case, 
94 Utah 97, and the Markey case, 186 So. 757. The Badger 
case was a suit at law to recover an unpaid balance due on 
a fully matured certificate. The Markey case was a suit at 
law to recover damages occasioned by the fraudulent acts 
complained of. 
Upon the trial our general demurrer did not succeed 
in "smoking out" (of record) the kind of suit upon which 
appellants intended to rely. But on page 9 of their brief 
in this Court, to avoid the dilemma which even they recog-
nize would exist in an action at law, appellants say that 
this case is "one in equity." Here, as in the Badger case, 
it is alleged that part payment only of the debt evidenced 
by the allegedly rna tured certificates has been made, and a 
money judgment is demanded for the "unpaid amounts 
thereof." Obviously the statement of this cause of action 
at law and the tort action for damages impelled the trial 
court to overrule the general demurrer. Any claimed cause 
of action in equity for recission of the transactions com-
plained of is fatally defective for failure to tender back 
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the "various property" or other considerations received by 
the respective appellants without offering any excuse for 
such failure. 
In 9 C. J., at page 1241, the law is thus stated: 
"In nearly all jurisdictions a bill is demurrable 
in which complainant does not offer to return any 
consideration which it shows that he has received, 
or otherwise place defendant in statu quo, or suffi-
ciently excuse himself from this duty." 
In Rosenthyne v. Matthews-McCullock Co. et al., 51 
Utah 38, 168 Pac. 957, reference is made to said 9 C. J. 
at pages 1207-1219, where the well-settled law in harmony 
with our contention is announced, and this Court says (pp. 
43-4 of the Utah report) that the law there stated is "the 
doctrine which controls in such cases." 
To same effect see : 
Kelly et al. v. Kershaw, 5 Utah 29·5, 14 Pac. 804, 
at p. 296 of the Utah report;· 
21 c. J., p. 400; 
12 c. J. s., p. 1004; 
In re Fox West Coast Theatres, 88 Fed. (2d) 
212 (9th C. C. A.) ; 
Gillette et al. v. Oberholtzer et al., 264 Pac. 229, 
at 230; 
Higgins v. First National Bank, 183 Atl. 197 
(N. J.), at 198; 
De Lange v. Ogden et al., 106 S. W. (2d) 
385 (Texas), at 302. 
As appears from the allegations of the complaint above 
summarized, it contains : 
( 1) The alleged causes of action in contract of the 
respective appellants (each separate and distinct from the 
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others, no two of which arise out of "the same transaction," 
and no appellant having any title or interest in or right to 
prosecute any cause of action except his own or to com-
plain of any breach by the Association of its contract with 
any other appellant) for a money judgment representing, as 
in the Badger case, the difference between the amount paid 
and the amount alleged to be due from the Association on 
the certificates; 
(2) Allegation and demand for recission of each of 
the separate and distinct transactions whereby the respec-
tive plaintiffs are alleged to have parted with their stock, 
no appellant having any interest in or right to complain of 
any transaction except that to which he was a party; 
(3) The separate and distinct alleged causes of action 
of the respective appellants in tort for conspiracy (no ap-
pellant having any concern in or right to complain of the 
insufficiency of any consideration moving to other appel-
lants or to question or complain of any alleged false repre-
sentations other than those made to and believed and relied 
upon by him) with a prayer for judgment not only against 
the Association issuing the certificates but against the two 
other corporate defendants and each and all of the individ-
ual defendants for an amount that would be the proper meas-
ure of damage under such a cause of action, to wit, the dif-
ference between the respective amounts paid and the ma-
tured value of the certificates; 
( 4) Causes of action of the respective appellants for 
an accounting with respect to alleged improper and exces-
sive commissions paid to agents and the right to recover 
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which is vested in the corporations alleged to have paid 
same, to wit, the Association and Colonial Corporation; 
( 5) Causes of action of the respective appellants for 
an accounting with respect to alleged excessive salaries paid 
by the Association to the defendant Dyes, which causes of 
action if any are vested in said Association; 
(6) Causes of action of the respective appellants to 
set aside the alleged fraudulent conveyance to Colonial Cor-
poration, which causes of action if any are vested in the 
Association; 
(7) The various causes of action of the respective 
plaintiffs against defendants, including the Association, and 
their cause of action in behalf of the Association "for an 
accounting and return to" its treasury of the assets alleged 
to have been turned over to Colonial Corporation. The 
Association is both plaintiff and defendant. 
We very much doubt if a more extraordinary example 
of "shotgun" pleading than this complaint has ever been 
filed in any court. Accepting certain of its allegations as 
true, it is "just like the Badger case" -a suit at law to 
recover a balance due under the contracts alleged. Other 
allegations and the prayer for a money judgment against 
all defendants brand it as a tort action at law to recover 
damages for the alleged frauds. And, as above indicated, 
appellants say that the suit is "one in equity." Obviously 
the causes of action in contract and in tort are in irrecon-
cilable conflict with the cause of action in equity for rescis-
sion. 
In Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 
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Pac. 196, the well-settled law in this and other jurisdictions 
relative to election of rights and remedies is thus stated at 
page 169 of the Utah report: 
"It is well settled that one who is induced to 
make a sale or trade by the deceit of a vendee has 
the choice of two remedies upon his discovery of the 
fraud; he may affirm the contract and sue for his 
damages, or he may rescind it and sue for the prop-
erty he has sold or what he has paid out on the 
contract. The former remedy counts upon the af-
firmance or validity of the transaction, the latter 
repudiates the transaction and counts upon its in-
validity. The two remedies are inconsistent, and the 
choice of one rejects the other, because the sale 
cannot be valid and void at the same time." 
THE COMPLAINT IS MULTIFARIOUS 
In addition to 104-3-16, U. C. A., cited on page 8 of 
appellants' brief and which provides that "when the ques-
tion is one of a common or general interest of many per-
sons, or when the parties are numerous and. it is imprac-
ticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may 
sue or defend for the benefit of all," another section of our 
Code, to wit, 104-7-3, U. C. A., is pertinent and controlling. 
It reads as follows : 
"The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint 
several causes of action, legal or equitable or both, 
where they all arise out of : 
" ( 1) The same transaction, or transactions con-
nected with the same subject of action; or, 
"(2) Contract, express or implied; or 
"(3) Injuries, with or without force, to person 
and property, or either; or, 
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'' ( 4) Injuries to character; or, 
" ( 5) Claims to recover real property with or 
without damages for the withholding thereof, and the 
rents and profits of the same, or waste committed 
thereon ; or, 
"(6) Claims to recover personal property, with 
or without damages for the withholding thereof; or, 
"(7) Claims against a trustee by virtue of a 
contract or by operation of law. 
"But the causes of action so united must all 
belong to one of these classes, and, except in actions 
for the foreclosure of mortgages and of other liens, 
must affect all the parties to the action, must not 
require different places of trial, and they must be 
separately stated." 
It will be observed that the last quoted section expressly 
refers to "equitable" as well as legal causes of action. The 
constitutionality of said section has not as yet been ques-
tioned. The codes of many States include sections in sub-
stance identical with 104-3-16 and 104-7-3, U. C. A. The 
courts of those States, without a single exception, construe 
those sections as forbidding joinder of parties and causes 
of action as has been attempted in the case at bar. 
Even had the cited Utah statutes never been enacted 
and were the equity practice (old or new) controlling, the 
complaint would be fatally defective. 
In Creer et al. v. Bancroft Land & Irrigation Co., 90 
Pac. 228 (Idaho), fourteen plaintiffs brought suit in equity 
to compel defendants to furnish each plaintiff the amount 
of water specified in his contract with defendant to be 
received by him. All of the contracts were upon the same 
printed form, with the same provisions except as to the 
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quantity of water to be delivered to the respective plaintiffs. 
In sustaining a demurrer based upon misjoinder of parties 
and causes of action, the Idaho court says at page 230: 
"Each of the plaintiffs bases his action upon 
the contract executed to him alone. Neither of the 
plaintiffs have any interest whatever in the contract 
of either of the other plaintiffs. It is a well-settled 
rule that two or more persons having distinct causes 
of action, although against the same defendant, may 
not join as plaintiffs." (Numerous cases cited.) 
In Lockha.rt v. Christian et al., 219 Pac. 490 (N. M.), 
after quoting a statute in substance the same as our 104-7-3, 
the court says at page 491 : 
"The terms of this statute are clear and free 
from doubt or ambiguity. Two things are necessary 
in order to properly unite more than one cause of 
action. They must belong to one of the classes enum-
erated in the statute, and they must each affect all 
of the parties to the suit." 
In Holland Oil & Gas Co. et al. v. Holland et al., 220 
Pac. 1044 (Kan.), it was alleged that each of the plaintiffs 
had been induced to buy an interest in a worthless oil and 
gas lease by identical misrepresentations made to each of 
them. After quoting Kansas statutes in substance identical 
with those of Utah, the court says at page 1045: 
"In this instance the cause of action of each 
plaintiff was fraud committed by false representa-
tions made to him and relied on by him to his damage. 
Although under the allegations of the petition the 
false representations made to the various plaintiffs 
were the same, the torts committed were several. No 
plaintiff was affected by the cause of action of any 
other, or interested in the relief demanded by any 
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other. The question whether Downing or Adams or 
Puterbaugh had been defrauded to his injury was. 
personal to him, and not of common or general 
interest. If Downing's case should be tried and he 
should recover, the necessary elements of Adams' 
or Puterbaugh's cause of action would not be estab-
lished." 
In F. S. Harrmon & Co. v. Eastern Furniture Co. et al., 
255 Pac. 964 (Wash.), construing Washington statutes sub-
stantially like the above cited Utah sections, the court says 
at page 966: 
"While we have given the cited statutes a lib· 
eral construction~ we have never held that two or 
more causes of action could be united simply because 
they arose out of contract or arose out of the same 
transaction; the rule is applicable only where all of 
the parties to the action are affected by all of the 
causes of action." 
In Baker v. Hanson et al., 231 Pac. 902 (Mont.), one 
of the causes of action pleaded confessedly affected all of the 
parties, but another cause of action pleaded did not. At 
page 904, after quoting the Montana statute substantially 
like the closing paragraph of 104-7-3, U. C. A., the court 
says: 
"As observed before, the cause of action upon 
the claim for $650.86 does affect all of these 
parties, but the cause of action upon the claim for 
$1,290 does not affect the defendant Fidelity Com-
pany; hence the two causes of action cannot be 
joined, and the court erred in overruling the special 
demurrer to the complaint." 
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In Pittsburg etc. Co. v. "J~Vakefield Hardware Co., 47 
S. E. 234 (N. C.), the court, after saying that each of the 
causes of action "must affect all the parties to the trans-
action," approves the following statement of the law at 
page 234: 
"It 'is not sufficient that some of the defendants 
be affected by each of them. All of the defendants 
must be affected by each of them to wa.rrant the 
union of them in one suit." 
Also see: 
Felt City Townsite Co. v. Felt Investment Co. 
et al., 50 Utah 364, 167 Pac. 835, at page 
370 of the Utah report; 
Crummer v. Wilson et al., 237 Pac. 1035 (Kan.); 
Jordan et al. v. Buick Motor Co. et al., 75 Fed. 
(2d) 447 (7th C. C. A.) ; 
Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. et al., 297 
Fed. 422 (8th C. C. A.) ; 
Walser et al. v. Moran, 173 Pac. 1149 (Nev.). 
Appellants seek to avoid the clear mandate of the Utah 
statutes and the uniform decisions of the courts forbidding 
joinders like those here attempted by stressing the great 
number of plaintiffs and others alleged to be similarly 
situated and the alleged multiplicity of suits to be avoided. 
They forget that such considerations alone are never suf-
ficient to invoke the jurisdiction of equity, and in contend-
ing otherwise they are in conflict with Mr. Pomeroy upon 
whom they so heavily lean for support. 
In Pomeroy's Code Remedies (3rd Ed.) the language 
of 104-3-16, U. C. A., relative to the propriety of a joinder 
of several plaintiffs or a class suit where "the question is 
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one of a common or general interest of many persons" is 
quoted on page 454, and in his discussion of that section the 
author says at page 455r: 
"The suit cannot be sustained by one as the 
representative of the many others who really sue 
in his name, unless it could have been maintained 
if all these many others had been regularly joined 
as co-plaintiffs, or unless it could have been main-
tained by each of them suing separately and for 
himself." 
We seriously question appellants' interpretation of 
Section 245 and other sections of Volume 1 of Pomeroy's 
Equity Jurisprudence cited in their brief. Several courts 
have severely criticized some of the language there employed, 
and no court in any jurisdiction, state or federal, has ever 
approved any such law or doctrine as that which appellants 
ascribe to Mr. Pomeroy. In Section 2511;2 of said Volume 1, 
Mr. Pomeroy aptly states that the jurisdiction of equity 
does not exist "because of multiplicity of suits but to avoid 
them" and condemns "spurious 'bills of peace,' " where, after 
joinder, there would merely be "a bundle of separate suits." 
Although Mr. Pomeroy has never advocated a doctrine 
that would permit a joinder of plaintiffs having separate 
and distinct causes of action arising out of separate and 
distinct transactions where an adjudication of the claims of 
one plaintiff could not operate as an adjudication of the 
rights of any other plaintiff and where the claims of each 
must necessarily rest on different evidence, he has approved 
a more liberal rule with respect to joinder than that generally 
followed. Cases like Duke et al. v. Boyd County, 7 S. W. (2d) 
839 (Ky.), where the rights. of three plaintiff peace officers 
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and twenty-five other peace officers to recover a fee fixed by 
statute would be conclusively determined by an adjudication 
as to the constitutionality of the statute illustrate this de-
parture. But see Lile et al. v. Kefauver et al., 51 S. W. (2d) 
473 (Ky.), in which the court- discusses its decision in the 
Duke case. A joinder of various persons each claiming to 
be a creditor of a defunct bank sought to join as plaintiffs 
in a suit to recover judgment against the directors for 
the respective amounts claimed by them. In support of its 
conclusion that there could be no class suit or a joinder of 
causes of action by two or more plaintiffs, the court says at 
page 475: 
"In cases where an individual creditor seeks to 
recover a debt due him, there is no such community 
of interest with other claimants having similar claims 
as to authorize a class suit." 
In Miller et al. v. Arizona Bank et al., 43 Pac. (2d) 518 
(Ariz.), the text from Pomeroy relied upon by appellants is 
discussed at length. At page 528 the court thus announces 
what it believes to be "the true test to be applied" in deter-
mining whether there may be a class suit or a joinder of 
various plaintiffs and causes of action: 
"Can proof of the vital fact necessary to estab-
lish the right of one plaintiff be made by the same 
evidence which is necessary to establish a correspond-
ing right in each of the other plaintiffs?" 
In the course of its opinion ( pp. 526-7) the Arizona 
court quotes at length from the decision of the Supreme 
Court of California in Noroian v. Bennett, 179 Pac. 158, 
159, where joinder was denied because there was "no single 
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fact or act, the determination of which will determine the 
rights of all the plaintiffs" and because, although the causes 
of action of the various plaintiffs were similar and based 
upon the alleged fraud of the defendants, each was separate 
and distinct from the others and not "capable of proof by 
the same evidence." The opinions in the California and 
Arizona cases just cited are well worth reading. 
In Whiting v. Elmira Industrial Ass'n., 61 N. Y. Supp. 
27, cited by appellants, suit was brought by plaintiff in 
behalf of himself and others in like situation for profits 
from the sale of lots alleged to be due pursuant to a contract 
between the parties.. The court calls attention to the fact 
that the only possible difference between the claims of 
plaintiff and other parties to the contract in whose behalf 
he brought suit was in the amounts to be distributed between 
them and rema~ks that this difference "is more mythical than 
genuine." In the later case of Brown v. W erblin et al., 244 
N. Y. Supp. 209, a situation very similar to that in the case 
at bar was presented. Plaintiff there brought suit for 
herself and for the benefit of all others similarly situated. 
She alleged that the defendants entered into a conspiracy 
to reap large profits by victimizing innocent investors in 
the preferred and common stocks of Advance-Rumely Com-
pany by agreeing to form a pool to acquire large blocks of 
said stocks; to create a false market for same; to procure 
the publication in tipsters' sheets of articles calculated to 
deceive; and through various other devices recited in detail 
to induce plaintiffs to buy said stocks and thus lose large 
sums of money. It was further. alleged in the complaint 
that profits realized in these fraudulent transactions were 
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a trust fund, to which plaintiff and others similarly situated 
were entitled. With reference to Sec. 195 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act of New York (in substance like 104-7-3, U. C. A.) 
and the right of plaintiff to prosecute the suit, the court 
says at pages 212-13 : 
"A representative action cannot be maintained 
unless it appears from the allegations of the com-
plaint that the plaintiff not only has a cause of action 
but that he is representative of a common or general 
interest of others. Bouton v. Van Buren, 229 N. Y. 
17, 127 N. E. 477. Here there is neither community 
of right or interest in the subject-matter of the 
action nor in the questions of law or fact involved. 
Each plaintiff has a several right to recover, in an 
action at law, the damage, if any, sustained by reason 
of defendants' fraud. Each plaintiff's action is nec-
essarily predicated upon the facts which induced him 
to act. The right of each individual is not derivative. 
It must stand on allegations and proof peculiar to 
itself and dissociated from the others. None has an 
interest in the cause of action or the damage recov-
erable by another. In such a case a class action may 
not be maintained." 
It would unduly lengthen this brief to attempt an 
analysis of all the authorities cited by appellants. They con-
sist of cases like White v. Texas Co. et al., 59 Utah 180, hold-
ing that officers of a corporation, like other persons, are 
liable for damages occasioned by their fraud; that class 
suits by taxpayers and depositors of the usual type are not 
forbidden; that all beneficiaries of a trust fund, as well as 
parties to a single contract, including third party beneficiar-
ies, may properly join in any suit to protect their common 
rights; that where the rights of all plaintiffs are dependent 
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upon the same question and will be determined upon the 
same evidence, such plaintiffs and their causes of action 
may be united in one complaint. 
In 114 A. L. R., beginning on page 1015, appears an 
annotation of numerous authorities touching the question 
of joinder in suits like the case at bar. At page 1016 refer-
ence is made to Mr. Pomeroy's discussion of the subject, 
and after quoting from Section 269, 1 Pomeroy's Equity 
Jurisprudence (4th Ed.), the editor seems to indicate an 
uncertainty as to just what the text means .. He says, how-
.ever: 
"Whatever support the text statement above 
quoted may have in the cases generally, it seems that 
the doctrine stated by the learned author has not 
thus far been so applied as to permit the mainten-
ance of a representative tort action based on sim-
ilar frauds separately practiced by the same defen-
dant upon different individuals." 
Immediately following, on the same page, the editor 
.says with reference to class suits in equity: 
"Class or representative suits to obtain the recis-
sion of transactions based on similar frauds prac-
ticed by one defendant upon various, and commonly 
numerous, persons, have so often been held not 
maintainable that one may well doubt whether under 
any circumstances such a suit will lie. One of the 
basic difficulties is not merely that the various 
transactions are legally distinct, but that each case 
is, or at least may prove to be, to some extent dif-
ferent. Even where the false representations were 
exactly the same, the various persons victimized 
may have acted upon different opinions and beliefs 
.as to the facts; one may have relied upon one sup-
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posed fact, another upon a different one, and some 
may have largely acted upon their own judgment as 
to business possibilities, etc. Furthermore, each has 
an election of remedies, all may not desire the same 
relief, and some may not be entitled to any relief. 
In some cases the interests of the various victims 
may be conflicting." 
On page 1019 the following statement with reference 
to law actions is made : 
"Thus far, neither under existing codes nor 
under general rules of law, has a representative ac-
tion to recover damages for similar frauds practiced 
on numerous persons been upheld. In general, the 
objections to such suits seem to be the same as those 
applying to representative suits to rescind for fraud; 
namely, that the demands of the various defrauded 
parties are not only legally distinct, but each de-
pends upon its own facts, and that a material dif-
ference in facts may exist. Furthermore, a choice 
of remedies is ordinarily presented, and the plaintiff 
cannot know that other persons similarly situated 
will not elect to affirm the fraudulent transaction." 
The annotation contains numerous citations from many 
jurisdictions. A vast number of other decisions fully 
support the text. But in view of the fact that no authority 
has been found by us or Mr. Walton or Mr. Pomeroy or 
the editor of A. L. R. which supports appellants' conten-
tion that they may unite their several causes of action in 
one complaint or prosecute a class suit, it would seem 
unnecessary to amplify our citations touching this question. 
In Linden Land Co. et al. v. Milwaukee Ry. & Lighting 
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Co. et al., 83 N. W. 851 (Wis.), in refusing to permit a class 
suit,. the court says, at page 856 : 
"The theory of the action, where one properly 
sues for all, is that the result is conclusive on all 
who are similarly situated, and whom the plaintiff 
rightfully represents; and such must be the theory, 
or else the plaintiff does not represent all, and the 
statement that he does is not only false, but absurd." 
Even were it possible to assume that the named plain-
tiffs in this suit have a clear right to join and recover a 
money judgment for breach of contract andjor damages for 
fraud andjor rescission and to prosecute for "the use and 
benefit of defendant" Association the alleged cause of 
action for fraudulent conveyance of assets to Colonial Cor-
poration and to obtain the appointment of a receiver of 
the assets of both the Association and Colonial Corporation 
because of insolvency and to obtain a liquidation of the 
Association and a distribution of its assets, would such mani-
fold adjudication or any part of it be "conclusive on all 
who are similarly situated"? 
Perhaps, in at least some instances, the "various prop-
erty" for which others alleged to be similarly situated sold 
or traded their stock is now worth much more than the face 
value of their certificates. Especially if the financial condi-
tion of the ·Association is as bad as that painted in the 
.complaint, there may be many "others similarly situated" 
who would much prefer to retain the "various property" 
by them received than be reinstated as stockholders. But 
however this may be, they and not the named plaintiffs have 
the right to decide whether they wish to rescind or abide 
by the transaction pursuant to which they disposed of their 
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stock. As expressly held by this Court in the Cook case, 
supra (69 Utah 161), this right of decision is vested in the 
defrauded party. It may not be exercised by any other per-
son, however benevolent his purpose may be. 
If funds of the Association have been wrongfully dis-
bursed and its assets fraudulently conveyed as alleged and 
were the absurd statement of its insolvency true, would 
appellants' claimed right to prosecute a class suit and make 
the necessary election for "others similarly situated" be 
thereby fortified? Would not the alleged financial mis-
fortunes and difficulties of the Association be an added rea-
son why "others similarly situated" would have the exclusive 
right and authority to make their own decision? 
Among other conclusive reasons why appellants inay 
not be permitted to speak for "others similarly situated" 
is that they do not allege· and cannot possibly know whether 
such "others" believed or acted in reliance upon any alleged 
false representation or when any alleged fraud was dis-
covered by such "others" or the circumstances surrounding 
such discovery. 
Another reason why there is a fatal misjoinder of 
causes of action will be discussed in the subtitle next below 
appearing. 
The Association Is Made Both a Plaintiff 
and a Defendant 
In their complaint appellants allege that the "defend-
ants have wrongfully misappropriated and diverted from 
the treasury of said Building and Loan Association large 
sums of money for excessive salaries to the said Dyes and 
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illegitimate expenses in the commission of said frauds" 
and pray for an accounting therefor by the defendants. 
A fraudulent conveyance by the Association to Colonial 
Corporation is alleged (R. 6) and judgment is sought against 
Colonial Corporation to the use of defendant Association 
for an accounting and return to the treasury of assets thus. 
conveyed. Insolvency of said two corporations is alleged, 
and a receiver to take charge of their assets is demanded, 
a liquidation and distribution of the assets of the Associa-
tion being also prayed (R. 7). 
These demands may not be joined in a single suit 
brought by one plaintiff or by any number of plaintiffs. 
In Blake et al. v. Boston Develpment Co. et al., 50 Utah 
347, 167 Pac. 672, suit was brought by stockholders against 
a corporation and its officers and directors. It was alleged: 
that the corporation was dominated by one of the directors, 
to wit, Vahrenkamp; that at the time of its incorporation 
all of defendant corporation's stock was transferred to 
Vahrenkamp in consideration of the conveyance by him to 
the company of three worthless mining claims; that com-
pany affairs had been grossly mismanaged; that various 
property and funds of the company had been fraudulently 
taken over by Vahrenkamp without consideration; that 
defendant officers and directors had permitted Vahrenkamp 
to take large blocks of company stock without any payment 
therefor and had permitted him by false credits on the books 
to avoid payment of assessments that had been levied upon 
outstanding stock which outsiders, including plaintiffs, had 
been compelled to pay; and that certain assessments had 
been unlawfully and fraudulently levied. Unlike the com-
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plaint in the case at bar, it was alleged due effort had been 
made to secure corporate action in the premises. In their 
prayer plaintiffs asked: that the corporation and defendant 
officers and directors be enjoined from selling stock to pay 
a recent assessment improperly levied; that defendants be 
required to show cause why a receiver should not be ap-
pointed; that certain former assessments alleged to be unlaw-
ful be declared fraudulent and void; that the individual 
defendants be required to make a full accounting in the 
premises; and that they might have general relief. The 
complaint was attacked upon the following grounds: "that 
separate and independent causes of action are commingled; 
that there are several causes of action improperly united 
in the comJ;llaint; that there is a cause of action stated in 
favor of the corporation and against the officers and direc-
tors of the corporation; and another alleged cause of action 
is stated against the incorporation for an injunction, and 
still another to annul and set aside certain assessments, 
and a further cause of action on behalf of the plaintiffs for 
personal relief" (pp. 3,52-3 of the Utah report). The trial 
court sustained the motion and demurrers based upon the 
foregoing grounds, and upon plaintiffs' refusing to plead 
further entered judgment dismissing the action. 
At page 354 this Court concurs in the holding of the 
Alabama decision there cited that although a stockholder 
may sue to protect the rights of the corporation where it 
fails to do so itself "that will not justify the joining of 
causes of action for and against the corporation." At pages 
355-6 this Court says : 
"The fact, however, that the corporation does 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
not bring the action for itself in its own name does 
not give the plaintiffs, who are acting on behalf of 
the corporation, the right to join causes of action 
in one complaint that the corporation could not have 
joined, and of course, they, under no circumstances, 
have the right to commingle several causes of action 
in one statement. The attempt, therefore, to join 
a cause of action to enjoin the corporation from 
collecting certain assessments, which we have seen 
is a cause of action against the corporation, with one 
for an accounting against the officers and directors 
of the corporation, which is a cause of action in its 
favor, cannot be sustained." 
In Beal v. United Properties Co., 189 Pac. 346 (Cal.) 
(a case very pertinent to other phases of misjoinder earlier 
discussed), after stating that assets of a corporation illegally 
dissipated should be returned to it as claimed by plaintiff 
in the complaint, the court says: 
"It is manifest, however, that he cannot join 
such an action (wherein he is suing as a trustee of 
the corporation and in the nature of a guardian) with 
an action in his own behalf wherein he is seeking 
personal relief." 
Also see: James v. Steifer Mining Co., 171 Pac. 
117 (Cal.). 
The causes of action for an accounting and to set aside 
the claimed fraudulent conveyance to Colonial Corporation 
as alleged could, of course, be only derivative. Pursuant 
to the allegations and prayer of the complaint, title to such 
causes of action is in defendant Association. That appel-
lants sue as stockholders and not as creditors conclusively 
appears from various allegations of the complaint, including 
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the emphatic statements in paragraph 13 thereof (R. 4) 
that the alleged claims of the Association that appellants' 
stock has been retired, paid and canceled and that they 
have no rights or interest therein "are wholly without right" 
and the prayer of the complaint (R. 7) "that it be adjudged 
that they are still the owners of said certificates." Any 
possible question as to the status in which they sue is 
further removed by paragraph 5 of the prayer (R. 7) where-
in they expressly seek judgment against Colonial Corpora-
tion "for an accounting and return to the treasury" of the 
Association of assets alleged to have been turned over to 
Colonial Corporation. Such a judgment would, of course, 
be entirely foreign to a suit by a creditor seeking to set 
aside a fraudulent conveyance; he seeks and, if successful, 
is granted direct recourse against the conveyed property 
to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim. On page 15 
of appellants' brief "the main contention of the plaintiffs" 
is stated to be "that they are entitled to be regarded as 
still members and shareholders of the building and loan 
association." 
At various places in appellants' brief mention (without 
argument) is made of "insolvency," "trust fund," "prorat-
ing," and other subjects often pertinent in cases where num-
erous parties may properly be joined. But insolvency of 
one or more defendants or the existence of a trust fund or 
a necessity for prorating are not specified in 104-7-3, U. C. 
A. as reasons for avoiding its mandate that all causes of 
action sued on "must all belong to one" of the specified 
classes and "must affect all the parties to the action." In a 
large percentage of equity suits similar to the case at bar~ 
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the complaint contained some or all of the following allega-
tions: insolvency of a corporate defendant primarily liable 
to plaintiff, with demand for a receiver of its assets; right 
.of recourse against a trust fund and a necessity for prorat-
ing. Among such cases (each of which is very pertinent to 
the questions of misjoinder here involved) are the following: 
Ballew Lumber & Hardware Co. et al. v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ry. Co. et al., 232 S. W. 1015 
(Mo.); 
Rural Credit Subscribers' Ass'n. et al. v. Jett et 
al., 266 S. W. 240 (Ky.) ; 
Brown v. W erblin et al., 244 N. Y. Supp. 209, 
supra; 
Stewart et al. v. Ficken et al., 149 S. E. 164 
(S. C.); 
Spear et al. v. Greene Co. et al., 140 N. E. 795 
(Mass.); 
Lile et al. v. Kefauver et al., 5,1 S. W. (2d) 473 
(Ky.), supra. 
THE DEMURRERS FOR UNCERTAINTY 
Even the author of appellants' brief will doubtless con-
"Cede that the four and a half pages devoted to the special 
demurrers are somewhat sketchy. Replying in kind we 
might simply refer to the demurrers with no further com-
ment than our statement that they were properly sustained. 
Of the two pages of appellants' brief on this question which 
do not consist of mere dogmatic statement, one and a half 
pages are directed to Ground 24 of the demurrer, which 
attacks the complaint because it contains no explanation 
of why the alleged frauds or the facts constituting same 
,were not earlier discovered. On page 16 of their brief 
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appellants say that this "demurrer raises a question which 
deserves and demands the consideration of the court." Two 
Kansas cases with one from New Mexico and another from 
Washington are cited in support of the complaint's allega-
tion. Here at last appellants have been able to discover per-
tinent authority adverse to a ruling of the trial court. 
We believe their discovery "deserves and demands the con-
sideration of the court." But unfortunately the better 
reasoning and the overwhelming weight of authority are 
against them even on this point. That a plaintiff commenc-
ing suit for fraud after the limitation period has elapsed, 
in order to avoid the statute, must not only set forth in 
his complaint the time when he discovered the fraud but 
also the circumstances attending such discovery is announced 
without qualification in the following texts : 
37 C. J., pp. 1200 et seq.; 
34 Am. J ur ., Sec. 425; 
4 Sutherland Code Pleading, Practice and Forms, 
Sec. 6888. 
Among the numerous decisions following the doctrine 
announced in the above cited texts are the following: 
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135; 
Hardt v. Heidweyer, 152 U.S. 547; 
Lady Washington Consolidated Co. v. Wood et 
al., 45 Pac. 809 (Cal.}-a leading and fre-
quently cited case; 
Davis v. Rite-Lite Sales Co. et al., 67 Pac. (2d) 
1039 (Cal.), at 1041-2. 
The action of the trial court in sustaining the general 
demurrer to the alleged cause of action of "others similarly 
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situated" (Ground 8) is not assigned as error. On page 14 
of their brief appellants refer to this demurrer as Ground 
12 and say that it became wholly immaterial because the 
court sustained the motion to strike the various references 
in the complaint to "others similarly situated." It seems 
to us that this statement in the brief puts the cart before 
the horse. Of course the sole reason for striking out the 
language specified in the motion was because the court 
found that no cause of action was stated in favor of ·such 
other persons. 
This brief is already longer than we had intended. 
Because our grounds of uncertainty necessarily indicate 
the precise subject of attack and require little if any elucida-
tion, and because appellants have been so sparing of argu-
ment and citation touching the trial court's rulings on the 
questions thus presented, we shall leave this phase of the 
case after inviting attention to a few of the obvious defects 
found by the trial court of so grave a nature that, as we 
believe, no court would approve them. 
On page 15 of their brief appellants dispose of Grounds 
13, 15, 17 and 23 with the statement that the uncertainties 
-there complained of are peculiarly within the knowledge 
of the defendants. We invite attention to those subdivisions 
of the demurrer (R. 27-30) and the uncertainties there 
indicated. For example, the statement of the complaint 
that during the years 1934, 1935 and 1936, through its 
agents, defendant Association came into possession of ap-
pellants' certificates which had been parted with by plain-
tiffs without receiving anything but "various property" 
having no "substantial value" is attacked as uncertain 
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because the complaint contains no allegation of the nature, 
identity or value of said "various property" or of the mean-
ing or intended meaning of the words "substantial value" 
or of the manner in which or from whom defendant Associa-
tion came into possession of the certificates (Ground 13), 
or what officer or agent of corporate defendants or any of 
them took part in the alleged transactions with appellants 
(Ground 14), or how or in what manner the alleged ficti-
tious and sham market was created or manipulated or 
depressed or when or where such action occurred, or what 
if any officer or agent of any corporate defendant thus 
acted in its behalf (Ground 15), or what consideration was 
actually paid to plaintiffs or any of them for their certifi-
cates (Ground 17), or the occasion, identity or nature of 
any transaction or transactions pursuant to which plaintiffs 
or any of them parted with possession of their certificates 
(Ground 23). 
If appellants' idea of what constitutes a good and 
sufficient pleading is correct, A's complaint for an alleged 
breach of contract by B would be a model of perfection 
if it merely set forth: that B through some unnamed 
agent on some unnamed occasion entered into a contract 
with him; that B breached the contract; and that as a result 
of such breach A had been damaged. When asked by special 
demurrer to disclose the identity of the alleged agent and 
the agreed consideration and other terms and provisions 
of the alleged contract~\ might, with just impatience, reply 
that those minor details were all peculiarly within B's 
knowledge. If the demurrer were sustained A would, of 
course, refuse to amend and would appeal to this Court. 
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If instead of being thus wronged by breach of contract 
A alleged that sometime, somewhere B's agent had fraudu-
lently induced him to exchange his cow for "various prop-
erty," any inquiry as to the identity of the alleged agent or , 
as to the "various property" or the facts and circumstances 
surrounding and identifying the alleged transaction would, 
as appellants contend, be as to matters peculiarly within 
B's knowledge. In the illustrations given, as in the case 
at bar, A and not B was present on the occasion complained 
of. A certainly had first hand knowledge of the alleged 
transaction; he knew the person with whom he dealt and 
the identity of the "various property" by him received. B's 
knowledge would necessarily be based upon hearsay. In 
the case at bar is there some undisclosed reason why appel-
lants do not wish to reveal the names of the alleged agents 
with whom they dealt or the nature and identity of the 
"various property"? 
In support of their contention that the demurrers for 
uncertainty were improperly sustained, appellants cite In-
dustrial Commission v. Wasatch Grading Co,., 80 Utah 223, 
on page 19 of their brief and there say: "Less certainty 
is required where the facts are peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the adversary." We agree with that statement 
and with the cited case from which it was apparently 
taken. On page 235 of 80 Utah, immediately preceding 
such statement, this Court says that a complaint should 
contain "an averment of facts with such certainty as will 
reasonably inform the defendant what is proposed to be 
proved so that he may have a fair opportunity to meet 
the alleged facts and prepare his defense." We earnestly 
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mtend that the yardstick thus fixed should be applied in 
tis case. 
~ ANY GENERAL OR SPECIAL DEMURRER WAS 
PROPERLY SUSTAINED, THE JUDGMENT 
MUST BE AFFIRMED 
Pursuant to the elementary rule that a judgment of a 
,wer court will be affirmed if there is any ground upon 
hich to sustain it, the judgment of dismissal here appealed 
·om must be affirmed if the trial court was right in any 
:the rulings complained of. 
Further citation than the three cases next below cited 
ould seem to be unnecessary. 
In Davie v. Board of Regents, 227 Pac. 243 (Cal.), the 
mrt says at page 247: 
"If the complaint is insufficient upon any ground 
properly specified in the demurrer the order must 
be sustained, though the lower court may have 
deemed it sufficient in that respect and may in its 
order have declared it defective only in some par-
ticular in which tee hold it to be good." 
In Haddad v. McDowell et al., 3 Pac. (2d) 550 (Cal.), 
demurrer was filed for uncertainty, misjoinder of parties 
{endant, joinder of several causes of action without stat-
g them separately, and failure to state facts sufficient 
constitute a cause of action. At page 551 the court says: 
"If the demurrer is well taken as to any of the 
grounds stated therein, then the order of the court 
sustaining the demurrer must be affirmed by the 
reviewing court." 
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In State v. Oklahoma City et al., 168 Pac. 227 (Okla.), 
in harmony with the well-settled rule with respect to judg-
ments appealed from, the court says at page 230: 
"The order sustaining the demurrer expressly 
states that it was based upon the second ground 
thereof, which we have discussed. However, in 
passing upon the correctness of the court's ruling, J 
we are not confined to the reasons given for sus- . 
taining the demurrer and dismissing the plaintiff's J 
cause of action or to the particular grounds of the .! 
demurrer, but will consider all of the grounds as-
signed and sustain the order if any of such grounds ~ 
are well taken." ; 
After having obtained many extensions of time within 
which to file an amended complaint, appellants elected tor 
stand on their pleading. As stated in the Davie case, supra 
(p. 247) : "Having done so, the judgment on demurrer will 
not be reversed merely in order to allow an amendment." 
Respectfully submitted, 
STUART P. DOBBS, 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE, 
P. T. FARNSWORTH, JR., 
Attorneys for Respondents Ogden; 
First Federal Savings and Loant) 
A_ssocia.tion, Colonial Corpora-; 
twn, M. L. Dye and S . G. Dye;
1 
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